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Abstract
This paper puts together the origins and the development of
price level targeting in Sweden and the inflation targeting in
New Zealand. It highlights the common and dissimilar char-
acteristics of the two monetary regimes, the two interpretations
of “price stability”. Solid historical evidence shows that either
inflation stabilization or – contrary to the conventional wisdom
of our era – price stabilization can be a feasible goal of mone-
tary policy.
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1 Introduction
In our days there is a consensus that the task of the monetary
policy is to create a safe environment where the price system, so
the economy can work effectively. The Bretton Woods Agree-
ment established in 1944 was an attempt to create such an inter-
national monetary system where one tried to combine long-term
price stability of the gold standard and the short-term flexibility
of regimes based on fiat money. Since paper money issuing did
not comply with consistent rules concerning the fix exchange
rate regime and the long-term dollar-gold exchange rate, the
regime collapsed after experiencing intense crisis between 1969
and 1973.1. Inflation perceived during the two decades after the
fall of the agreement was high and volatile even in the developed
countries, too. This period is characterized by seeking adequate
nominal anchor, and no “universal” one was found.
Inflation targeting as a monetary regime has been named since
1989. In this year, the legislative body of New Zealand approved
the bill to restructure the fundamentals in the operation of the
central bank, whose core concept has spread around the world
since. In this regime, the main task of the monetary authorities
is to keep inflation at a pre-set value or within a band. On the
model of New Zealand, countries implementing such a regime in
the early 1990s (Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, Sweden,
Finland, Spain) have been enjoying low-level inflation with ad-
equate economic growth, and this can be told about developing
countries taking up the regime later on (Israel, the Czech Re-
public, Poland, Korea). Experience fostered several supportive
studies which make the prime role of inflation targeting regime
almost unquestionable, at least for the economy of developed
countries.2 The other side of the coin is that during the same
period, a general decrease in inflation was perceived worldwide.
The empirical research of Dueker and Fischer (2006) [5] claims
that it is hard to separate whether positive results have come
1Black and Gavin (1990)[4]
2Leiderman and Svensson (1995)[11] and Bernanke et al. (1999) [13] ana-
lyze the experience of developed countries, while Mishkin (2003) [13] focuses
on transaction countries. Amato and Gerlach (2002)[1] find that with appropri-
ate modifications inflation targeting is an adequate choice for developing coun-
tries.
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from inflation targeting or from the general sinking of inflation.
Although inflation targeting declares endeavoring to maintain
“price stability”, in reality, it does not maintain that on a long
run. Focusing on low inflation does not mean price stability by
itself, since inflation shocks build into the price level, and their
correction does not happen. Here it would be more precise to
use the expression “inflation stability”. If inflation has already
been pined down to a permanent low level, the desire for such
an alternative regime would be palpable that can really finish off
the long-term uncertainty of the price level. However, according
to “conventional wisdom”, the consequence of price level stabi-
lization is the higher volatility of inflation and the output gap.
This statement has been queried by Svensson (1999)[17], Vestin
(2006)[18], and others in the recent years. The basic idea is that
a price level target serves as a firm nominal anchor, as it provides
substantial information on the current stance of the monetary
policy and clearly signs the long-run goal, which can form the
expectations of the private sector such a way that the variability
of the inflation falls, causing higher social welfare compared to
the one under inflation targeting. There is just one example in
history to price level targeting, and it happened during the 1930s
in Sweden with an experiment to target consumer price index.3
In the decades after the turn of the 19th and the 20th century,
sticking to price level targeting was not an odd opinion at all
– a multitude of scientific studies stood behind it. At the time
this new course of research studies was reaffirmed by the mul-
tiplying problems of the quasi-fixed international exchange rate
system which had worked well previously but started to lose ef-
fectiveness after World War I, and the spreading crisis emerging
thereof.
Our aim is to take a retrospective look in history at the events
of the two milestones in economic history and economic theory,
and compare the two regimes, their dissimilarities and common
features, deducting general conclusions.4
The Swedish price level targeting5
The Swedish minister of finance declared on September 27,
1931 that the country would break off from the gold standard
regime, and set the preservation of the purchasing power of the
Swedish krona as its primary goal. This declaration has vari-
ous antecedents. Due to World War I and the Great Depression,
there was a decade-long deflationary pressure. Between 1921
and 1931, consumer prices fell by approximately 30 percent in
Sweden, while wholesale prices fell by the same rate only in the
last three years of this period. Unemployment rate that had been
a stable 10 to 12 percent since 1923 started to rise sharply – it
was 17.2 percent in 1931. Since the Bank of England suspended
3Ohlin (1933) [14] used the expression “experiment” first, in order to em-
phasize the novelty of the program.
4Guender and Oh (2006) [9] made a similar comparison, however our find-
ings differ in several points. Moreover we draw conclusions related to the future.
5In this chapter we take study of Berg and Jonung (1999) [2] as a basis,
which gives the comprehensive evaluation of the Swedish price level targeting.
the availability of exchange the British pound to gold in order to
prevent gold outflow, on September 19, 1931, there was a spec-
ulative attack against the Swedish krona which was pegged to
the pound. The gold standard , which worked perfectly before
the war, was shaken to its basis, and Swedish economic leaders
had to find an alternative solution as quick as possible.
The thought of price stabilization first appeared in the study
of Wicksell (1936) [19].6 His concept is that the central bank
can use its instruments to make the interest rates of the commer-
cial banks compared to the “natural” interest rate move, hence
it can influence the price level. The natural interest rate means
that expected real return which would clean the credit market
in an economy having no inflation or deflation and working at
its highest effectiveness.7 The problem with this process is that
there is no clear-cut information on natural interest rate. Wick-
sell claims that it is enough to take a look at prices. If they rise,
then commercial interest rates would be too low compared to the
natural rate – if they fall, then they are too high. When Sweden
decided to leave the gold standard system behind on September
26, 1931, Cassel, the famous “wicksellian” economist of the era
recommended the government introduce price level target as the
new nominal anchor.8 There was no long-lasting counselling or
preparation – the September 27 announcement of the new goal
of monetary policy was just a one-sentence declaration.9 The
circumstances of the change are not only the imprint of the cri-
sis, but it also reflects the effect and opinion-forming influence
of the economists of that era.10 The other reason there was no
major preparation is that the solution was considered to be tem-
porary, during the stumble of the gold standard regime, as this
was thought to be temporary, too.
The parliament of Sweden approved the five-point monetary
program on price level in May 1932. During the period follow-
ing the change, implementing the idea of price level targeting
into practice was carried out not without problems. A certain
amount of time had to pass till decision makers could leave old
pattern behind. After the break-off from the gold standard, the
Riksbank kept on raising the discount rate despite the worldwide
perceived general deflation, because they were concerned about
6 First publishing was in 1898, in English it was translated long after in
1936. Later Irving Fisher (1920) [7] argued for the stabilization of the purchas-
ing power of the money, too.
7Wicksell’s cumulative process is this: if the central bank set the interest
rate lower than the “natural” interest rate (marginal productivity of capital) with
given expectations, there would be excess demand for credit, so thus the quantity
of money would increase, too. As supply can react with lag, rising price level
makes the return of the capital even appealing, further amplifying the borrowing
and the demand. This process keeps until interest rate rises and equals to the
return of the capital.
8Before the implementation of the regime there was an alternative possibility.
Davidson’s idea was to lower price level proportionally with the growing of
productivity, but this solution raised lots of methodology problems.
9 Berg and Jonung (1999) p.529 [2]
10In the process of the implementation and the continuous reform of the
regime advices of Cassel, Heckscher and Davidson were always considered by
the government.
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 Fig. 1. Main economic indicators of Sweden, 1921-193911
the spin-up of inflation. The concern about price rise was based
on the thought that before the withdrawal from the gold stan-
dard, the rise of inflation originating from the outflow of gold,
then from the break-off of the krona from the British pound was
considered more persistent and of a higher scale than deflation-
ary pressure. Raising of the discount rate from 6 to 8 percent
in September 1931 was unnecessary – it was adjusted to 6 per-
cent at the end of the year, and was set gradually to 3 percent
in the next year. In a crisis situation, such monetary restriction
could have severe consequences, but it is likely that external fac-
tors had the major role in the depression. This is supported by
those two facts that the downturn was more moderate in Sweden
when compared to other countries, and that the largest drop was
observed in the export sector of the country.
11Source of data: CPI, inflation: Statistiska centralbyran,
exchange rate, discount rate: http://www.historicalstatistics.org,
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Withdrawing from the gold standard and the use of price level
targeting contributed the enduring rise of the Swedish economy
from 1933.12 Up to 1937, consumer price index was managed
within a band of 3 percent compared to the base price index
of September 1931, and apart from one price shock, no major
volatility was shown before World War 2. It should be empha-
sized that the explicitly non-targeted wholesale price of 1937
was at the level of 1928. After the speculative attack and before
the enactment of the price level targeting, significant fluctuation
of the pound/krona exchange rate could be seen. By the year
1934, this volatility came to calm, which means that the Riks-
bank could achieve its dual explicit-implicit goal, the stabiliza-
tion of price and exchange rate in the following four years. Be-
sides, it contributed to the boost of the economy: from 1933 on-
ward, the rise in industrial production meant a 10-percent drop
in the unemployment rate, which fell to the level perceived in
the 1920s (see Fig. 1).
There are more than one reason for stopping the experiment.
Despite success, it was apparent that conflict may rise between
the stability of the krona pegged to the British pound and keep-
ing the price level target in certain situations, when one of them
has to be given priority. At the beginning of 1937, British
price level rose. In spite of Cassel and Heckscher’s advice, the
central bank of Sweden opted for the stabilization of the ex-
change rate, but this meant a permanent pressure on the con-
sumer price index, which inevitably and permanently crossed
the upper boundary of the target band. As the activist Keynesian
approach gained wider acceptance, the Riksbank was given an
additional task in 1937, namely the assignment of higher coop-
eration with the fiscal policy in order to reduce unemployment.
The main supporters of this idea were Ohlin and Myrdahl, two
well-known economists of the Stockholm School who promoted
the necessity of anti-cyclical intervention.13 Monetary program
became a complex economic program by then. This was coup
de grace to price level targeting, since the neoclassic theory that
formed its base has positioned itself on the other pole in the
question of role of government.
2 The evolution of inflation targeting in New Zealand14
On December 20, 1989, the parliament of New Zealand voted
unanimously on the new central bank bill, the so-called Reserve
unemployment:
http://www.library.northwestern.edu
/govinfo/collections/league/stat.html
12 It is not a coincidence that Fisher (1934) [8] and Lindahl (1937) [12]
thought, the Swedish experiment is only the first step of the evolution of a new
price targeting international monetary system, which will change the then fixed
exchange rate system.
13 In his evaluation of 1933 Ohlin [14] admitted the merits of price level
targeting in reining the deflationary spiral, but he emphasized the importance of
stabilization of the unemployment first.
14We based this chapter on the writings of Evans et al. (1996) [6], Reddel
(1999) [15] and Sherwin (1999) [16], which give detailed portrays of the New
Zealandian economic reform and the development of inflation targeting.
Bank Act, which inured on February 1, 1990.15 This was the
first time that a monetary regime declaring formal inflation tar-
geting came to existence. This has been a brand new concept
since the dissolution of the Bretton Woods system characterized
by an international environment of high and volatile inflation,
where central banks rather emphasized intermediate targets (ex-
change rate, monetary aggregate) that were to be achieved via
lower risk, and they did not even think of influencing the final
goal “directly”.
The road to the act that restructured monetary policy took al-
most five years to complete, and formed an organic part of the
reform process to restructure the economy. Searching for op-
tions was forced by a staggering economy. During the decade
following the oil crisis, the scampered and volatile inflation cou-
pled with rising interest rates, which worsened the outlook of
economic growth. Depreciation of New Zealand dollar enlarged
the further foreign indebtedness of the country. When a new
“crisis-managing” government entered office after elections in
1984, its first order of business was to issue deregulation on
the money market: restrictions on interest rates were abolished
in days16, and restrictions to currency conversion were pulled
down by March 1985, which meant that the New Zealand dol-
lar has become free floating. In the new situation provided by
the reforms, the central bank of New Zealand (Reserve Bank of
New Zealand, RBNZ) tried to target the so-called Primary Liq-
uidity.17 It became obvious in a rather short period of time that it
cannot fulfill the role of a nominal anchor, because it remained
very volatile, and that the movement of interest and exchange
rate could not be allayed. The quest for solution went on - the
government began to think about targeting the nominal GDP. In
the subsequent two years, it became clear that the targets are
extremely far from the realized values.
In mid-1986, minister of finance Roger Douglas called upon
a meeting with the officers of the central bank and the Treasury.
During the dispute of 1987-88, two key demands concerning
the future operation of the central bank were envisioned: first
of all, the central bank shall have autonomy, which makes it
independent of political intrusions, and second of all, it shall be
accountable, which ensures its full commitment to achieving the
ultimate goals. Total operational independence was put forward
by the central bank, while accountability fixed in the job contract
of the central bank’s governor was suggested by the Treasury’s18
specialists.
Although inflation fell by a high degree and became of sin-
gle digit (9 percent) in 1988, Douglas was concerned of stuck
15Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act, Public Act No. 157.
16On 27 June, 1984 was the first bond tender, where the government financed
its borrowing requirement at market-determined interest rates.
17Narrow monetary aggregate, consist of the balances banks held in their ac-
counts at the Reserve Bank and holdings of those securities which can be sold
back to the Reserve Bank on demand.
18The Treasury founded in 1840. At that time it only managed the daily fi-
nances of the government, since then it became the leader economic and finan-
cial consultant institution of the government.
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of the expectations, hence he expressed the government’s ex-
pectation of a 0 to 1 percent inflation target band in a television
interview and via other means of communication.19 The opin-
ion of the central bank concerning fast disinflation was not the
unambiguous, because they claimed that “the gains likely to ac-
crue from the use of inflation targets are limited and the cost,
although unknown, of a continued tight monetary policy stance
over the next year or two potentially high.”20 In spite of that, it
was announced in June of the very same year that “price stabil-
ity” may be achieved by the end of 1990 as the final goal, which
was defined as a 0 to 2 percent change in the consumer price
index.
The first Policy Target Agreement (PTA) which was agreed
upon by the minister of finance and the governor of the central
bank on March 2, 1990 set the obligations of the governor of
the central bank in order to achieve the inflation target set by
the government, and in this connection the governor’s half-year
statement. Should the central bank be unable to achieve them,
the governor of the central bank could be removed from office as
prescribed by the agreement. In exceptional cases, like terms of
trade shock, the rise of an indirect tax, which means exogenous
price shocks not related to the operations of the central bank,
deviation from the previously set inflation target can be done
with impunity, but the new target path has to be agreed upon.
This clearly shows that such a monetary strategy requires con-
stant follow-up in both the instruments used and the target set.
In order to increase transparency, the so-called Settlement Cash
Balance, a narrow reserve aggregate was discarded on March
7, 1997, which – just like the Primary Liquidity before – failed
to conduct monetary conditions properly, and the Official Cash
Rate, a benchmark to overnight central bank interest rate has
been introduced as the main instrument and the policy rate, too
since March 17, 1999. In practice, the operation of the regime
accompanied with the shift of emphasis on goals, as it is shown
by the 1996 amendment of the PTA, which sets the maintenance
of price stability as the main task of the monetary policy, which
“can make its maximum contribution to sustainable economic
growth, employment and development opportunities within the
New Zealand economy”.21 The new courses appear explicitly
in the 1999 PTA, which says that “In pursuing its price stabil-
ity objective, the Bank shall implement monetary policy in a
sustainable, consistent and transparent manner and shall seek to
avoid unnecessary instability in output, interest rates and the
exchange rate.”22 After the successful disinflation, these sec-
ondary goals started to move into the foreground. It is no sur-
prise that with built-up credibility the counter-actions to mitigate
a potential shock as soon as possible were and are used less fre-
quently, and gradual approach is emphasized.
19Reddell (1999) [15] p. 67.
20 Price Stability and Inflation Targets, RBNZ Memorandum to the Minister
of Finance (No 2536, 2537), 1988 July
21 http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monpol/pta/0040554.html
22 http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/news/1999/0092613.html
The paradigm shift in economy management put the economy
of New Zealand on a track towards enduring growth, combined
with stable and low inflation. In the period of 1994-2006, av-
erage economic growth was 2.93 percent, and the average con-
sumer price index rise was 2.17 percent.23 It can be told that the
new monetary policy frame resulted in a lower and much more
stable inflation than in the 15 years preceding the reform, which
was largely due to the higher calculability of the policy of the
central bank. After the successful disinflation, trust in the cen-
tral bank rose among the public, and the accumulated credibility
contributed largely to the advantageous economic tendencies of
the latest era (see Fig. 2).
3 Similar and different aspects of the two regimes
We could see that both monetary regimes meant a paradigm
shift when compared to the previous era – they were of pioneer
style. The Swedish experiment proved that in spite of negative
external effects, depression can be turned around by price level
stabilization, while the New Zealandian reform played an un-
questionable role in regaining the credibility of the monetary
policy via independence, transparency and the elaboration of
the novel accountability mechanism. The two strategies show
decisive difference in the circumstances of implementation, the
depth of codification, the instruments used, the transparency, but
they have similar aspects, too.
The circumstances of implementation differ for a reason. In
the case of Sweden, immediate action was needed which did
not and could not mean the immediate institutional restructure
of the regime. In New Zealand, adverse economic environment
was not worldwide but country-dependent. There was no such
double squeeze, therefore, there was longer time to elaborate a
new and comprehensive strategy and to restructure the opera-
tional environment of the RBNZ. In Sweden, nobody thought
– at least at the beginning – such a deep institutional reform,
since the break-off from the gold standard, thus operating an al-
ternative price level strategy was thought to be temporary. The
operation of the monetary policy was set in a five-point program
by the Swedish parliament in 1932.24
On the other hand, we have to point at the fact that the theoret-
ical basis of the two regimes was quite different. In the decades
preceding the introduction of the Swedish price level targeting,
well-founded theories proved the stabilization of the price level,
even under the guardianship of famous economists of the era,
while in the case of New Zealand, such literature did not ex-
ist beside those emphasizing the importance of topic time in-
consistency. In this period, many central banks worked as the
long arm of the ministry of finance – this was the case in New
Zealand, too. The innovation of inflation targeting was actually
carried out by practical experts via iterative method – theoret-
23Average of yearly data. Resource of yearly data: World Bank,
http://devdata.worldbank.org/query/default.htm
24 In 1933 it was amended with a sixth point, which confirmed the full instru-
ment independence of the Riksbank.
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 Fig. 2. Main economic indicators of New Zealand, 1985-200626
ical approach was performed much later, in the mid 1990s, by
the pioneer studies of the Swedish Lars Svensson in the fore-
ground.25 One may hit an ironic tone to claim that support-
ive scientific studies appeared by increasing numbers after the
regime has been already successful.
25 From that point it is not a surprise that in 2000 Svensson was requested
as an independent and prominent expert for a comprehensive evaluation of the
monetary system of New Zealand.
26Source of data: CPI, inflation, unemployment: World Bank,
Getting the message across and the popularization of the new
regimes were leading aspects in both cases, since they held the
key to success. In Sweden, the major performance evaluations
of 1933 and 1937 by the ministry of finance, and the declara-
tion and newspaper articles of Cassel, Heckscher and partially
Davidson made the price level targeting theory known, while in
the case of New Zealand, information was spread via the channel
Official Cash Rate, exchange rates: Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
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of the central bank communication which is the main pillar of
inflation targeting. In the latter case, the credibility of the central
bank had to be built from nothing due to the lack of popular and
authentic supporters, which can be felt clearly that they could
influence the markets only after showing some sorts of result for
a while. Another form of difference is that forecasts and their
public release have formed a vital part among the means of the
general and so the New Zealandian inflation targeting regime,
while such a system could not be seen in Swedish price stabi-
lization. Such characteristic is not the result of a free choice
for sure, since econometric methods that could have been used
to create exact forecasts calculating with interdependent effects
did not exist in the 1930s.
Both central banks had no goal independence but had instru-
ment independence, although the applied instruments were dif-
ferent. The Swedish regime resulted in the stabilization of the
discount rate in accordance withWicksell’s theory, and they also
highly emphasized exchange rate stability. Monetary aggregates
had no role in communication, and they were not targeted ei-
ther.27 Au contraire, the RNBZ refrained itself from foreign
exchange market intervention, and used a quasi monetary tar-
geting in the first period of its operation; later on, due to its low
effectiveness, instruments were simplified to interest rate policy
and the communication of the inflation target which is easier to
comprehend by markets. No instrument constrains remained in
the regime; every instrument was subordinated to the achieve-
ment of the ultimate goal. It seems natural that the scope of
goals to be achieved kept on widening as positive results were
perceived. When it was not about deflation in Sweden or infla-
tion in New Zealand that darkened the horizon for the economy
management, other aspects were brought to the highlights: un-
employment and the stimulation of the economy in Sweden, or
smoothing the path of the interest rates and the exchange rate
in New Zealand. Whereas, this process disrupted the coherence
of the regime in Sweden, the priority of goals has never been
questioned in New Zealand. There are no such complementary
goals in inflation targeting that can be seen in the practice of
the Swedish price level targeting, which could, in certain cases,
confront the ultimate goal, as it happened in Sweden in 1937
and later.
4 Summary
Inflation targeting having debuted in New Zealand and having
gained wider acceptance in the 1990s helped developed coun-
tries, and later on, more and more developing countries to take a
stable disinflation process, and – which is even more important
– they could keep inflation at a permanent low level. The world-
wide perceived reduction in the tendency of price index growth
has raised the question again, what one could gain via real price
stability? Uncertainty around the value of the price level that
keeps on growing along the time horizon of the forecast is char-
27Keleher (1991) [10]
acteristic for all the monetary regimes of our era. The Swedish
“episode” of the 1930s was the only proof in history for a price
level that can be planned, and this is likely to remain this way in
the near future.28 A paradigm shift is almost always done after
a crisis.
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